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We create variable-length pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) and strong PRPs (SPRPs)
accepting any input length chosen from the range of b to 2b bits from fixed-length, b-bit
PRPs. We utilize the elastic network that underlies the recently introduced concrete de-
sign of elastic block ciphers, exploiting it as a network of PRPs. We prove that three and
four-round elastic networks are variable-length PRPs and five-round elastic networks are
variable-length SPRPs, accepting any input length that is fixed in the range of b to 2b bits,
when the round functions are independently chosen fixed-length PRPs on b bits. We also
prove that these are the minimum number of rounds required.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we prove that the elastic network, the underlying structure of elastic block
ciphers [2], allows for the creation of variable-length PRPs and SPRPs from fixed-length
PRPs, meaning it provides a PRP or SPRP for every length individually within a range of
input lengths. In the abstract sense, a block cipher should be a SPRP. Feistel networks were
analyzed in this manner and proven to provide fixed-length PRPs and SPRPs under certain
conditions by Luby and Rackoff [7], and by Naor and Reingold [8]. This approach has also
been used to justify modes of encryption. For example, the CBC-Mask-CBC mode (CMC)
of encryption was proven to provide a SPRP on multiples of the block length under certain
conditions on the block cipher used within the mode [5]. In general, the implementation
of a block cipher can be considered a black box to applications making function calls to
the cipher. This is especially true in modern computers where block cipher hardware may
be included, such as Intel’s plan to have AES in hardware as part of its future CPUs [4].
Understanding how to combine PRPs in theory to provide additional functionality translates
into practical implementations by replacing the PRP with the black box that is the block
cipher.
We consider the elastic network in an analogous manner. Elastic block ciphers are
variable-length block ciphers created from existing block ciphers. The elastic version of a
block cipher supports any actual block size between one and two times that of the original
block size. The method consists of a substitution-permutation network, the elastic network,
that uses the round function from the existing fixed-length block cipher. We prove that three
and four round elastic networks provide variable-length PRPs and five round elastic net-
works provides a variable-length SPRP for each input length in the range of b to 2b bits
when the round functions are independently chosen fixed-length PRPs on b-bits.
Our results assist in proving the soundness of the elastic block cipher’s basic structure.
The security of elastic block ciphers against practical attacks was evaluated in [3]. By
proving the elastic network forms variable-length PRPs and SPRPs on inputs of b to 2b
bits, under certain restrictions on the number of rounds and independence of the round
functions as was done for Feistel networks [7, 8], our work provides further justification
for the elastic block cipher approach to creating variable-length block ciphers.
We consider analysis of the elastic block cipher approach to be of value because of
how the approach differs from other approaches that reuse existing block ciphers when cre-
ating a variable-length block cipher in practice. Unlike other variable-length block cipher
constructions that build upon existing fixed-length block ciphers, the elastic block cipher
approach does not require multiple applications of the fixed-length block cipher to encrypt
b+ y bits, where 0 ≤ y ≤ b. By using the round function of the existing fixed-length block
cipher as a black box within the elastic network the computational workload of an elastic
block cipher is proportional to the block size. In contrast, other methods, such as [1, 9, 10],
treat a fixed-length block cipher as a black box. When encrypting b + y bits, each of these
methods apply a block cipher multiple times along with additional operations, resulting in a
computational workload that is not proportional to the block size and which is less efficient
than padding the data to two full blocks, regardless of the exact value of y.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the defini-
tions of a PRP and SPRP, and the structure of elastic block ciphers. In Section 3, we show
how to create variable-length PRPs from fixed-length PRPs with three and four round elas-
tic networks. In Section 4, we prove that a five-round elastic network allows for the creation
of a variable-length SPRP from fixed-length PRPs. In Section 5, counter-examples used to
define the minimum number of rounds and independence of the round functions required
for the proofs are presented. In Section 6, we summarize our results and explain how the
elastic network can be combined with CMC mode to extend the supported input length
beyond 2b bits.
2 Background
2.1 PRP and SPRP Definitions
We informally remind the reader of the definitions of a PRP and a SPRP, and define the
terms variable-length PRP and variable-length SPRP. Refer to [6] for formal definitions.
Although we are discussing permutations (as opposed to practical block ciphers), we will
use the terms ”plaintext” and ”ciphertext” to refer to the inputs and outputs of the permu-
tation. We use the following terms in the definitions of a PRP and a SPRP.
– Random permutation: A permutation on b bits that is chosen randomly from all permu-
tations on b bits.
– Let P be a permutation on b bits. P−1 denotes its inverse. P (x) is the output of P
when given input x of length b bits.
– Chosen plaintext query: An adversary chooses an input, pi, to a permutation, P , and
receives the output, ci = P (pi).
– Chosen ciphertext query: An adversary chooses an input, ci, to the inverse of a permu-
tation, P−1, and receives the output, pi = P−1(ci).
– Chosen plaintext - chosen ciphertext queries: An adversary makes a series of queries
to a permutation, P , and its inverse, P−1, and receives the outputs.
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– Adaptive queries: When making chosen plaintext, chosen ciphertext or chosen plain-
text - chosen ciphertext queries to a permutation (and/or its inverse), the queries are
said to be adaptive if the adversary making the queries receives the output of the ith
query before forming the (i + 1)st query and can use the previous i queries and their
outputs when forming the (i + 1)st query.
The concepts of a PRP and a SPRP can be described by considering the probability
with which an adversary can correctly determine whether or not a black box contains a
specific permutation or a random permutation on b bits while using only polynomial (in
b) many resources. Let P be a permutation on b bits. Given a black box that contains
either P (or its inverse) or a random permutation, an adversary makes polynomially many
adaptive queries to the black box and receives the outputs of the permutation within the
box. If the probability that the adversary correctly determines (using polynomial time and
memory) the contents of the box is 1
2
+ e for negligible e ≥ 0, then P is a PRP. In terms of
block ciphers, this corresponds to the adversary being able to make either adaptive chosen
plaintext queries or adaptive chosen ciphertext queries, but not both, to a black box which
contains either the cipher or a random permutation.
Similarly, a permutation,P , on b bits is a SPRP if it is not possible to distinguishP from
a random permutation on b bits in polynomial (in b) time and memory when queries to both
the permutation and its inverse are permitted. In terms of block ciphers, this corresponds
to the adversary being able to make adaptive chosen plaintext - chosen ciphertext queries
to a black box which contains either the cipher or a random permutation.
We now define variable-length PRPs and SPRPs. Let P be a permutation that accepts
inputs of any length l within some range [x, y] where 0 < x < y. If P is a PRP for each
individual value of l (meaning y− x+ 1 PRPs exist, one for each input length) then P is a
variable-length PRP on the range [x, y]. Similarly, if P is a SPRP for each individual value
of l then P is a variable-length SPRP on the range [x, y]. In the variable-length case, an
adversary is allowed to choose any value of l in the range [x, y] before making any queries,
but once l is chosen it remains fixed and all queries performed by the adversary use inputs
of length l.
2.2 Elastic Network
We provide a brief review of the elastic network, which provides the underlying structure
of elastic block ciphers. The elastic block cipher method was defined for creating variable-
length block ciphers in practice [2]. The round function or cycle of an existing fixed-length,
b−bit, block cipher is inserted into the elastic network, shown in Figure 1 and becomes the
round function of the elastic version of the cipher. The input is b+y bits, where 0 ≤ y ≤ b.
In each round the leftmost b bits are processed by the round function and the rightmost y
bits are omitted from the round function. Afterwards, a ”swap step” is performed in which
the rightmost y bits are XORed with a subset of the leftmost b bits and the results swapped
when forming the input to the next round. 4
4 Elastic block ciphers also include initial and end-of-round whitening, and initial and final key-
dependent permutations. Our analysis focuses on the basic structure and thus we omit these steps.
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Fig. 1. Two Rounds of an Elastic Network
3 Variable-Length PRPs
As our first step, we prove that a three-round elastic network and the inverse of a four-round
elastic network are variable-length PRPs when their round functions are independently
chosen random permutations (RP). From these results, we can then prove that the same
networks are variable-length PRPs when the round functions are independently chosen
fixed-length PRPs. Figure 2 shows three-round and four-round elastic networks.
Fig. 2. Three and Four-Round Elastic Networks
We prove that if a three-round elastic network, G′, with round functions that are in-
dependently chosen random permutations on b bits can be distinguished from a random
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permutation on b+ y bits, for some fixed value of b+ y, using polynomially many queries
to G′ then at least one of the round functions can be distinguished from a random permu-
tation on b bits, which is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that G′ is a PRP. We use
a black box, BG′ , that contains either G′ or a random permutation on b+ y bits. We prove
that if a distinguisher, D3, exists that can determine whether or not BG′ contains G′ using
polynomially many adaptive queries to the box then D3 can be used to create a distin-
guisher for at least one of the round functions of G′ to distinguish the round function from
a random permutation on b bits. When we say a distinguisher for G′ exists, we mean that
the distinguisher, using polynomially many adaptive queries in one direction can predict or
eliminate a possibility about an additional input/output pair value of the given permutation
with greater certainty than that of a random guess. In contrast, with a random permutation,
anything beyond the input/output pairs from the queries is known with the same probability
as a random guess. We repeat the process for the inverse of a four-round elastic network.
We will refer to the components of the three and four-round networks as they are la-
belled in Figure 2. We use the following notation:
– b > 0 is an integer.
– y is an integer such that 0 ≤ y ≤ b.
– X⊕Y whereX is a b-bit string and Y is a y-bit string, means the bits of Y are XORed
with y specific bits of X and the other b− y bits of X are treated as if they are XORed
with 0’s. If the resulting string is stored in a variable containing only y bits instead of
b bits, the result consists only of the y bits in the positions that involved both X and
Y instead of X and the b − y 0’s. For example, consider XORing a 2-bit string with
a 4-bit string such that the XOR involves the leftmost 2 bits of the 4-bit string. Let z1
and a2 be 4-bit strings. Let w1 and w2 be 2-bit strings. If z1 = 0110 and w1 = 11,
a2 = z1⊕ w1 = 1010. w2 = z1⊕ w1 = 10.
– n > 0 is an integer that generically represents the number of polynomially many (in
terms of the length of the input) queries made to a function.
– |X | is the length, in bits, of X .
– RFi is the ith round function, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Any restrictions placed on a RFi will
be specified as needed. Each round function is a permutation on b-bits.
– ai is the b-bit input to the ith round function for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
– zi is the b-bit output of the ith round function for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
– wi is the y bits left out of the ith round function for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. For any particular
elastic network,w2 is formed from a fixed set of y-bit positions from z1, w3 is formed
from a fixed set of y-bit positions of z2, and w4 is formed from a fixed set of y-bit
positions of z3 (i.e., the positions of the bits taken from z1 to form w1 do not vary
amongst the inputs to a specific three-round elastic network). Likewise, when forming
w2, w3 and w4.
– When referring to a specific value for an ai, zi or wi, a subscript will be used. For
example, a1j .
Theorem 1. A three-round elastic network, G′, on b + y bits in which the round functions
are independently chosen random permutations on b bits is a variable-length pseudoran-
dom permutation on b + y bits in the encryption direction for any fixed value of y where
0 ≤ y ≤ b. Three rounds are the mininum number of rounds required.
Proof. A two-round elastic network cannot be a PRP. Refer to Section 5 for the counter-
example. We define the following notation for use in proving the three round case:
5
– BG′ is a black box that contains either G′ or a random permutation on b+ y bits.
– (a1i, w1i) is an input to BG′ . |a1i| = b and |w1i| = y as defined previously.
– (z3i, w3i) is the output of BG′ corresponding to the input (a1i, w1i). |z3i| = b and
|w3i| = y as defined previously.
– D3 is a distinguisher forG′, meaningD3 can determine whether or notBG′ containsG′
with probability 1
2
+α for non-negligibleα, 0 < α ≤ 1
2
when using only polynomially
(in b + y) many resources. Let D3 return a 1 if it thinks BG′ contains G′ and a 0
otherwise.D3 makesn adaptive chosen plaintext or adaptive chosen ciphertext queries,
but not both.
– S1 = {(a1i, w1i)} and S2 = {(z3i, w3i)}, for i = 1 to n are the sets of n inputs
and outputsD3 uses to distinguishG′ from a random permutation. When D3 works by
making queries to BG′ in the encryption direction, S1 contains the inputs and S2 con-
tains the resulting outputs. WhenD3 works by making queries toBG′ in the decryption
direction, S2 contains the inputs and S1 contains the resulting outputs.
– BRFi is a black box that contains either the ith round function,RFi, ofG′ or a random
permutation on b bits, for i = 1, 2, 3.
– BRFi(X) is the output of BRFi when given input X .
– B−1RFi(X) is the inverse of BRFi(X). i.e., the inverse of whatever permutation is in
BRFi is applied to X .
– DRFi is a distinguisher for RFi, meaning DRFi can determine whether or not BRFi
contains RFi with probability 1
2
+ α for non-negligible α, 0 < α ≤ 1
2
using poly-
nomially (in b + y) resources. DRFi uses either adaptive chosen plaintext or adaptive
chosen ciphertext queries, but not both.
– ”plaintext query” refers to a query to G′ in the encryption direction and ”ciphertext
query” refers to a query to G′ in the decryption direction (a query to G′−1).
We note that the bit positions used in the swap steps in G′ are not secret and this infor-
mation can be used by any distinguisher. We define the following functions corresponding
to the swap steps for use by the distinguishers:
– Let Fi(X,Y ) be a function that takes a b-bit input,X , and a y-bit input, Y , and returns
the pair (Z,W ) where Z is a b-bit string and W is a y-bit string. Fi replaces the y bits
of X with the y bits of Y such that the bits in X which are replaced are in the same
positions as the bits from the output of the ith round function that are involved in the
swap step after the ith round of G′. Fi returns the updated X value in Z and returns
a bit string, W , that contains the y bits of X that were removed from X XORed with
the y bits inserted into X . Fi(X,Y ) computes the inverse of the ith swap step in the
elastic network.
– Let FY i(X) be a function that takes a b-bit input X and returns the y bits that are in
the same bit positions used to create wi from z(i− 1) in G′.
– Let Oi be an oracle that contains the ith round function, RFi of G′. Oi−1 will refer to
an oracle containing RFi−1.
We now prove Theorem 1. If D3, a distinguisher for G′ in the encryption direction,
exists, D3 must fall into one of the following categories:
– Category I: D3 does not use the z3 portion of the output in its decision. The only part
of the output used is the w3 portion. This means that given the n input/output pairs in
S1 and S2, D3 never uses the z3 portion from any of the pairs in S2.
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– Category II: D3 does not use the w3 portion of the output in its decision. The only part
of the output used is the z3 portion. This means that given the n input/output pairs in
S1 and S2, D3 never uses the w3 portion from any of the pairs in S2.
– Category III: D3 uses both the z3 and w3 portion of the outputs in its decision. This
means that given n input/output pairs in S1 and S2, D3 uses the z3 portion of the
output from at least one of of the pairs in S2 and uses the w3 portion from at least
one of the pairs in S2. Without using both portions, D3 fails to distinguish the elastic
network from a RP.
In each category, there are no restrictions on what portions of the inputs, {(a1i, w1i)},
are used. For each of the categories, we will show that the existence of D3 implies a distin-
guisher can be formed for either the second or third round function ofG′, which contradicts
the round functions being independently chosen random permutations.
Category I: If D3 falls into Category I, a distinguisher, DRF2, can be defined for the
second round function, RF2. Intuitively,D3 using only the w3 portion of the output of G′
when w3 is from the output of RF2 whose inputs cannot be predicted with non-negligible
probability implies D3 can distinguish RF2 from a random permutation. The inputs to
RF2 are distinct except with negligible probability. Therefore, thew3 values are distributed
as if they are taken from the outputs of distinct queries to RF2, except with negligible
probability andD3 cannot rely on being givenw3 values that were generated from identical
inputs to RF2.
Define DRF2 as follows:
Ask D3 what its first query (input) would be if it was querying BG′ . Populate S1 with
this first input, so (a11, w11) has been chosen and is in S1. S1 is known to DRF2.
for i = 1 to n {
Take (a1i, w1i) from S1 for use in subsequent steps.
Set z1i = O1(a1).
Set z2i = BRF2(z1i ⊕ w1i).
Set w3i = FY 3(z2i).
Give a1i, w1i, w3i to D3.
Add to S1 the next input D3 would use when trying to distinguish D3, having
seen the inputs and partial output of the first i queries. This is (a1i+1, w1i+1).
}
Let ans be the value D3 returns.
Return ans.
The values given to D3 are the input and rightmost y bits of the output of a three-round
elastic network with RF1 as the first round function and the contents of BRF2 as the sec-
ond round function. The third round function is irrelevant here because D3 is not using the
output of the third round function. The values given toD3 correspond to those of S1 and the
w3i values of S2 when D3 is allowed to make n adaptive chosen plaintext queries to BG′ .
D3 succeeds with non-negligible probability in determining whether or not it was given the
input and partial output of G′ implies DRF2 will succeed with non-negligible probability
in determining if the n (a2i, z2i) pairs correspond to the inputs and outputs ofRF2. There-
fore, DRF2 can distinguish the contents of BRF2 using the n queries {O1(a1i) ⊕ w1i}.
BRF2, contradicting the assumption that the second round function is an RP.
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Category II: If D3 falls into Category II, a distinguisher, DRF3, can be defined for the
third round function, RF3. Intuitively, D3 using only the z3 portion of the output of G′
when z3 is from the output of RF3 whose inputs cannot be predicted with non-negligible
probability implies D3 can distinguish RF3 from a random permutation. The inputs to
RF3 are distinct except with negligible probability. Therefore, the z3 values are distributed
as if they are the outputs of n distinct queries to RF3, except with negligible probability
and D3 cannot depend on being given z3 values that were generated from identical inputs
to RF3. Therefore, D3 using only the input to G′ and the z3 portion of the output implies
D3 can distinguish RF3 from a random permutation.
Define DRF3 as follows:
Ask D3 what its first query (input) would be if it was querying BG′ . Populate S1 with
this first input, so (a11, w11) has been chosen and is in S1. S1 is known to DRF3.
for i = 1 to n {
Take (a1i, w1i) from S1 for use in subsequent steps.
Set z1i = O1(a1i).
Set z2i = O2(z1i ⊕ w1i).
Set w2i = FY 2(z1i).
Set z3i = BRF3(z2i ⊕ w2i).
Give a1i, w1i, z3i to D3.
Add to S1 the next input D3 would use when trying to distinguish D3, having
seen the inputs and partial output of the first i queries. This is (a1i+1, w1i+1).
}
Let ans be the value D3 returns.
Return ans.
The values given to D3 are the input and leftmost b bits of the output of a three-round
elastic network with RF1 as the first round function, RF2 as the second round function
and the contents of BRF3 as the third round function. The values given to D3 correspond
to those of S1 and the z3i values from S2 when D3 is allowed to make n adaptive chosen
plaintext queries to BG′ . D3 succeeds with non-negligible probability in determining it
was given the input and partial output ofG′ impliesDRF3 will succeed with non-negligible
probability in determining the contents ofBRF3 by using n queries, {O2(O1(a1i)⊕w1i)⊕
F2(O1(a1i))}, contradicting the assumption that the third round function is an RP.
Category III: If D3 falls into Category III, a second version of the DRF3 distinguisher
we just defined can be created for the third round function, RF3. We call this new version
DRF3v2. Intuitively, D3 using both the z3 and w3 portions of the output of G′ when z3 is
from the output of RF3 whose inputs cannot be predicted with non-negligible probability,
where w3 is from the output of RF2 whose inputs cannot be predicted with non-negligble
probability and where w3 contributes to the formation of the input of RF3 (and thus con-
tributes to the input to the permutation that produces z3) implies D3 can distinguish RF3
from random. D3 cannot depend on being given z3 and/or w3 values that were generated
by holding the inputs to RF2 and/orRF3 constant since this occurs with negligible proba-
bility. Therefore,D3 can be viewed as using some relationship between partial information
(i.e., w3) used in forming the input to RF3 and the output (ı.e., z3) of RF3 to distinguish
the third round function from a random permutation.
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DRF3v2 is DRF3 with the modification that w3i is given to D3 along with a1i, w1i and
z3i. Define DRFv2 as follows:
Ask D3 what its first query (input) would be if it was querying BG′ . Populate S1 with
this first input, so (a11, w11) has been chosen and is in S1. S1 is known to DRF3.
for i = 1 to n {
Take (a1i, w1i) from S1 for use in subsequent steps.
Set z1i = O1(a1).
Set z2i = O2(z1i ⊕ w1i).
Set w2i = FY 2(z1i).
Set z3i = BRF3(z2i ⊕ w2i).
Set w3i = FY 3(z2i).
Give a1i, w1i, z3i, w3i to D3.
Add to S1 the next input D3 would use when trying to distinguish D3, having
seen the inputs and output of the first i queries. This is (a1i+1, w1i+1).
}
Let ans be the value D3 returns.
Return ans.
The values given to D3 are the inputs and outputs of a three-round elastic network with
RF1 as the first round function, RF2 as the second round function and the contents of
BRF3 as the third round function. The values given to D3 correspond to those of S1 and
S2 when D3 is allowed to make n adaptive chosen plaintext queries to BG′ . D3 succeeds
with non-negligible probability in determining it was given the input and output of G′
implies DRF3v2 will succeed with non-negligible probability in determining the contents
of BRF3 by using n queries, {O2(O1(a1i) ⊕ w1i) ⊕ F2(O1(a1i))}, contradicting the
assumption that the third round function is a random permutation.
For each category, we have shown thatD3 cannot exist. Therefore, a three-round elastic
network cannot be distinguished from a PRP by using polynomially many plaintext queries
when the round functions are independently chosen random permutations. In the decryption
direction, four rounds are required to create a PRP.
Theorem 2. The inverse of a four-round elastic network, (G′−1), on b + y bits in which
the round functions are independently chosen random permutations on b bits is a variable-
length pseudorandom permutation on b+ y bits for any fixed value of y where 0 ≤ y ≤ b.
Four rounds are the minimum number of rounds required.
Proof. Refer to Section 5 for an example showing why three rounds are insufficient. The
notation and terms are the same as in the proof to Theorem 1 unless otherwise stated. The
black box, BG′ , will contain G′−1 or a random permutation on b + y bits. The categories
for the distinguisher are the same as in the three-round case. For two of the categories, three
rounds are sufficient for G′−1 to be a PRP. We prove these cases first. Then the proof for
the third category, which requires four rounds, follows directly. The inputs are of the form
(z3, w3) when using three rounds and (z4, w4) when using four rounds. The outputs are of
the form (a1, w1). D3 and D4 will denote the distinguishers when three and four rounds
are under consideration, respectively. When the number of rounds is not specified, Dr will
be used to denote either D3 or D4. If a distinguisher exists for G′−1 it must fall into one of
the following three categories:
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– Category I: Dr does not use the a1 portion of the output in its decision. The only part
of the output used is the w1 portion. This means that given the n input/output pairs in
S2 and S1, Dr never uses the a1 portion from any of the pairs in S1.
– Category II: Dr does not use the w1 portion of the output in its decision. The only part
of the output used is the a1 portion. This means that given the n input/output pairs in
S2 and S1, Dr never uses the w1 portion from any of the pairs in S1.
– Category III: Dr uses both the a1 and w1 portion of the outputs in its decision. This
means that given n input/output pairs in S2 and S1, Dr uses the a1 portion of the
output from at least one of them and uses the w1 portion from at least one of them.
Without using both portions, Dr fails to distinguish the elastic network from a RP.
In each category, there are no restrictions on what portions of the inputs, {(z3i, w3i)} or
{(z4i, w4i)}, are used. When Dr is restricted to Category II or III, only three rounds are
needed for G−1 to be a PRP. These two categories will be addressed before Category I.
Similar to what was done with the encryption direction, Dr can be used to create a distin-
guisher for one of the round functions. Since the round functions are random permutations,
this results in a contradiction; therefore, Dr cannot exist.
Category II: If D3 falls into Category II, a distinguisher, DRF1, can be defined for the in-
verse of the first round function ofG′ (the last round ofG′−1). Intuitively,D3 using only the
a1 portion of the output of G′−1 when a1 is from the output of RF1−1 whose inputs can-
not be predicted with non-negligible probability implies D3 can distinguishRF1−1 from a
random permutation. The inputs to RF1−1 are distinct except with negligible probability.
Therefore, the a1 values are distributed as if they are the outputs of n distinct queries to
RF1−1, except with negligible probability. Therefore,D3 using only the input to G′−1 and
the a1 portion of the output impliesD3 can distinguishRF1−1 from a random permutation.
Define DRF1 as follows:
Ask D3 what its first query (input) would be if it was querying BG′ . Populate S2 with
this first input, so (z31, w31) has been chosen and is in S2. S2 is known to DRF1.
for i = 1 to n {
Take (z3i, w3i) from S2 for use in subsequent steps.
Set a3i = O3−1(z3i).
Set (z2i, w2i) = F2(a3i, w3i).
Set a2i = O2−1(z2i).
Set (z1i, w1i) = F1(a2i, w2i).
Set a1i = B−1RF1(z1i).
Give a1i, z3i, w3i to D3.
Add to S2 the next input D3 would use when trying to distinguish D3, having
seen the inputs and output of the first i queries. This is (z3i+1, w3i+1).
}
Let ans be the value D3 returns.
DRF3v2 returns ans.
The values given to D3 are the inputs and outputs of the inverse of a three-round elastic
network with RF3 as the third round function, RF2 as the second round function and the
contents of BRF1 as the first round function. These values correspond to the contents of S2
and the a1i values of S1 whenD3 is allowed to make n adaptive chosen plaintext queries to
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BG′ . D3 succeeds with non-negligible probability in determining it was given the input and
output of G′ implies DRF1 will succeed with non-negligible probability in determining the
contents of BRF1, contradicting the assumption that the first round function is a random
permutation.
Category III: If D3 falls into Category III, a distinguisher, DRF3, can be defined for the
inverse of the first round function, RF1−1. Intuitively, D3 can be viewed as using some
relationship between partial information (i.e. w1) used in forming the input to RF1−1
and the output (ı.e. a1) of RF1−1 to distinguish the first round function from a random
permutation.
Define DRF1v2 to be DRF1 with the addition that the w1i values are also given to D3.
Ask D3 what its first query (input) would be if it was querying BG′ in the decryption
direction. Populate S2 with this first input, so (z31, w31) has been chosen and is in S2. S2
is known to DRF1v2.
for i = 1 to n {
Take (z3i, w3i) from S2 for use in subsequent steps.
Set a3i = O3−1(z3i).
Set (z2i, w2i) = F2(a3i, w3i).
Set a2i = O2−1(z2i).
Set (z1i, w1i) = F1(a2i, w2i).
Set a1i = B−1RF1(z1i).
Give a1i, w1i, z3i, w3i to D3.
Add to S2 the next input D3 would use when trying to distinguish
D3, having seen the inputs and output of the first i queries.
This is (z3i+1, w3i+1).
}
Let ans be the value D3 returns.
Return ans.
The values given to D3 are the inputs and outputs of the inverse of a three-round elastic
network with RF3 as the third round function, RF2 as the second round function and the
contents ofBRF1 as the first round function. These values correspond to those of S1 and S2
when D3 is allowed to make n adaptive chosen plaintext queries to BG′ . D3 succeeds with
non-negligible probability in determining it was given the input and output of G′ implies
DRF1v2 will succeed with non-negligible probability in determining the contents of BRF1,
contradicting the assumption that the first round function is a random permutation.
Category I: The result for this category follows directly from the results for Categories II
and III. If D4 only uses the w1 portion of the outputs, since w1 = w2 ⊕ a2, this implies
D4 is using a combination of a2 and w2 on which to base its decision. This implies D4
is a distinguisher for the first three rounds of the network in the decryption direction that
falls into Category III because the leftmost b-bit portion (a2) and rightmost y-bit portion
(w2) of the three round output is used. Assume D4 exists for the four-round network. D4
is used to define a distinguisher, D3, for the three rounds consisting of RF4−4 to RF2−2,
taking inputs (z4i, w4i) and producing outputs (a2i, w2i). In this case, BG′ is a black box
containing either G−1 with four-rounds or a random permutation on b + y bits. Let B3 be
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a black box containing either the three-round elastic network formed from rounds RF4−4
to RF2−2 or a random permutation on b+ y bits.
Define D3 as follows:
Ask D4 what its first query (input) would be if it was querying BG′ in the decryption
direction. Populate S2 with this first input, so (z41, w41) has been chosen and is in S2. S2
is known to D3.
for i = 1 to n {
Take (z4i, w4i) from S2 for use in subsequent steps.
Give (z4i, w4i) to B3 and get back (a2i, w2i).
Set w1i = a2i ⊕ w2i.
Give w1i, z4i, w4i to D4.
Add to S2 the next input D4 would use when trying to distinguish BG′ , having
seen the inputs and output of the first i queries. This is (z4i+1, w4i+1).
}
Let ans be the value D4 returns.
D3 returns ans.
The values given toD4 are the inputs and rightmost y bits of the outputs of the inverse of
a four-round elastic network. These y bits are formed from both the b-bit and y-bit portions
of the output of three rounds. Therefore, by the assumptionD4 exists, D3 will succeed with
non-negligible probability in determining that the (a2i, w2i) values were formed from the
first three rounds of decryption. This contradicts the previous result from Category III.
For each of the three categories, we have shownDr cannot exist. Therefore, the inverse
of a four-round elastic network is a PRP when the round functions are independently chosen
random permutations.
Using Theorems 1 and 2, we can prove that a three-round elastic network in the encryp-
tion direction and a four-round elastic network in the decryption direction is a variable-
length PRP when the round functions are independently chosen fixed-length PRPs.
Theorem 3. A three-round elastic network, G′, on b + y bits in which the round functions
are independently chosen PRPs on b bits is a variable-length PRP on b + y bits in the
encryption direction for any fixed value of y where 0 ≤ y ≤ b. Three rounds are the
mininum number of rounds required.
Proof. First, as noted in Theorem 1, a two-round elastic network cannot be a PRP. The
result for three rounds follows directly from Theorem 1 and the triangle inequality. We
consider the relationships between four versions of a three-round elastic network that differ
in regards to the number of their round functions that are PRPs and RPs. We consider the
relationships between the four versions shown in Figure 3 of a three-round elastic network.
In each version, the round functions are chosen independently of each other and map a b-bit
input to a b-bit output.
We define the following six permutations:
– Let PRP1, PRP2, PRP3 be three independently chosen pseudorandom permuta-
tions.
– Let RP1, RP2, RP3 be three independently chosen random permutations.
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Fig. 3. Three-Round Networks Consisting of RPs and PRPs
Let Ni refer to a three-round elastic network in the encryption direction in which the
first i round functions are pseudorandom permutations and the remaining round functions
are random permutations, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 defined as follows:
– N0: Each round function is a RP. The round functions are RP1, RP2 and RP3.
– N1: The first round function is the PRP. The second and third round functions are RPs.
The round functions are PRP1, RP2 and RP3.
– N2: The first two round functions are PRPs and the third round function is a RP. The
round functions are PRP1, PRP2 and RP3.
– N3: Each round function is a PRP. The round functions arePRP1, PRP2 andPRP3.
As shown by Theorem 1, N0 is a PRP. Therefore, if Theorem 3 is not true it is possible
to distinquishN3 fromN0 with probability≥ α for some non-negligibleαwhere 0 < α ≤
1. However, if N3 can be distinquished from random then at least one of PRP1, PRP2
and PRP3 can be distinguished from random, which is a contradiction to the definition of
a PRP and thus proves Theorem 3. Let D be a distinguisher that takes (b+y)-bit inputs and
runs in polynomial time. D outputs a 1 if it thinks the inputs are the outputs of a random
permutation and outputs a 0 otherwise. Let Pr(Ni) be the probability that D outputs a
1 when given polynomially many outputs from Ni. If N3 can be distinguished from a
random permutation, then |Pr(N0)− Pr(N3)| ≥ α. However,
|Pr(N0) − Pr(N3)| = |Pr(N0) − Pr(N1) + Pr(N1) − Pr(N2) + Pr(N2) −
Pr(N3)| ≤ |Pr(N0)− Pr(N1)|+ |Pr(N1)− Pr(N2)|+ |Pr(N2)− Pr(N3)|.
Therefore, α ≤ |Pr(N0)− Pr(N1)|+ |Pr(N1)− Pr(N2)|+ |Pr(N2)− Pr(N3)|.
This implies at least one term on the right side of the inequality is ≥ α
3
. Therefore, it is
possible to distinguish a three-round elastic network in the encryption direction that has
i round functions that are pseudorandom permutations and 3 − i round functions that are
random permutations from a three-round elastic network that has i−1 round functions that
are pseudorandom permutations and 4 − i round functions that are random permutations
with non-negligible probability, where i is at least one value from {1, 2, 3}. Therefore, it
is possible distinguish between a round function which is a random function and one that
is a pseudorandom function with non-negligible probability, contradicting the definition of
pseudorandom.
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Theorem 4. The inverse of a four-round elastic network, (G′−1), on b + y bits in which
the round functions are independently chosen PRPs on b bits is a variable-length pseudo-
random permutation on b + y bits for any fixed value of y where 0 ≤ y ≤ b. Four rounds
are the minimum number of rounds required.
Proof. First, as noted in Theorem 2, the inverse of a three-round elastic network cannot be a
PRP. The proof uses the same method as in the proof to Theorem 3, with each network now
having four rounds and Ni defined for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, with 4 − i round functions being
RPs and i round functions being PRPs. In each version, the round functions are chosen
independently of each other and map a b-bit input to a b-bit output.
We define the following eight permutations:
– Let PRP1, PRP2, PRP3, PRP4 be four independently chosen pseudorandom per-
mutations.
– Let RP1, RP2, RP3, RP4 be four independently chosen random permutations.
Let Ni refer to the inverse of a four-round elastic network in which the first i round
functions are pseudorandom permutations and the remaining round functions are random
permutations, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 defined as follows:
– N0: Each round function is a RP. The round functions are RP1,RP2, RP3 andRP4.
– N1: The first round function is the PRP. The second to fourth round functions are RPs.
The round functions are PRP1, RP2, RP3 and RP4.
– N2: The first two round functions are PRPs and the last two are RPs. The round func-
tions are PRP1, PRP2, RP3 and RP4.
– N3: The first three round functions are PRPs and the last one is a RP. The round
functions are PRP1, PRP2, PRP3 and RP4.
– N4: Each round function is a PRP. The round functions are PRP1, PRP2, PRP3
and PRP4.
As shown by Theorem 2, N0 is a PRP. Therefore, if Theorem 4 is not true it is possible
to distinquish N4 from N0 with probability ≥ α for some non-negligible α where 0 <
α ≤ 1. We will show that if N4 can be distinquished from random then at least one of
PRP1, PRP2, PRP3 and PRP4 can be distinguished from random in order to derive a
contradiction and thus conclude Theorem 4 is true.
Let D be a distinguisher that takes (b + y)-bit inputs and runs in polynomial time. D
outputs a 1 if it thinks the inputs are the outputs of a random permutation and outputs a 0
otherwise. LetPr(Ni) be the probability thatD outputs a 1 when given polynomially many
outputs from Ni. If N4 can be distinguished from a random permutation, then |Pr(N0)−
Pr(N4)| ≥ α.
However,
|Pr(N0) − Pr(N4)| = |Pr(N0) − Pr(N1) + Pr(N1) − Pr(N2) + Pr(N2) −
Pr(N3) + Pr(N3)− Pr(N4)|
≤ |Pr(N0)−Pr(N1)|+ |Pr(N1)−Pr(N2)|+ |Pr(N2)−Pr(N3)|+ |Pr(N3−
Pr(N4)|.
Therefore, α ≤ |Pr(N0) − Pr(N1)| + |Pr(N1) − Pr(N2)| + |Pr(N2) − Pr(N3)| +
|Pr(N3)− Pr(N4)|.
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This implies at least one term on the right side of the inequality is ≥ α
4
. Therefore, it is
possible to distinguish a four-round elastic network in the decryption direction that has i
round functions which are pseudorandom permutations and 4 − i round functions that are
random permutations from a four-round elastic network that has i− 1 round functions that
are pseudorandom permutations and 5 − i round functions that are random permutations
with non-negligible probability, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Therefore, it is possible distinguish
between a round function which is a random function and one that is a pseudorandom
function with non-negligible probability, contradicting the definition of pseudorandom.
4 Variable-Length SPRPs from Fixed-Length PRPs
We now show how to construct variable-length SPRPs from fixed-length PRPs. We prove
that a five-round elastic network in which the round functions are independently chosen
fixed-length PRPs is a variable-length SPRP. This allows us to form SPRPs on b + y bits
from b-bit PRPs, where 0 ≤ y ≤ b.
We note that a five-round elastic network consisting of round functions that are indepen-
dently chosen PRPs is a PRP in both the encryption and decryption directions by Theorems
3 and 4. We also note that by the definition of a SPRP, any random permutation is a SPRP.
Before stating the theorem regarding the b + y bit SPRP, we prove a claim. Let RP1 and
RP2 be two independently chosen random permutations, each on m bits. Let Perm1(x)
= RP2(RP1(x)), where x is of length m. Perm1 is a random permutation on m bits
and is a SPRP. Now we consider what happens if we use a combination of pseudorandom
permutations and permutations in place of RP1 and RP2. We define permutations, P1, P2,
PRP1 and PRP2 to satisfy the following conditions:
– P1(x) and P2(x) are independently chosen permutations on m bits. P1 6= P2 except
with negligible probability. P1 is not pseudorandom in that a relationship between
some subset of bits in its inputs and outputs that occurs with non-negligible probability
is known, but the exact permutation is unknown. Specifically, when given a black box
that contains either P1 or a random permutation on b bits, it is possible to determine
the contents of the box in polynomially many queries. However, when using P1 in
forming PA as defined below, the exact permutation corresponding to P1 is unknown
in that P1 will involve applying a PRP to the first b bits of its (b+y)-bit input. Likewise
for P2, which is used to form PB as defined below. The PRPs used in P1 and P2 are
not the same PRP, except with negligible probability.
– PRP1(x) and PRP2(x) are pseudorandom permutations on m bits whose indepen-
dence is defined by the independence of P1 and P2 such that
P2(PRP2(P1(x))) = PRP1−1(x).
– PA(x) = PRP2(P1(x))
– PB(x) = PRP1(P2(x)). Therefore, PB = PA−1
– Perm2 will refer to the permutation corresponding to PA and PB. Perm2 = PA
and Perm2−1 = PB.
It is possible to define P1, P2, PRP1 and PRP2 that satisfy these constraints. For exam-
ple, we will later show how a five-round elastic network can be viewed in this manner by
defining P1 to be the first round, P2 to be the inverse of the last round, PRP2 to be the
last four rounds and PRP1 to be the inverse of the first four rounds. Perm2 is a pseudo-
random permutation on m bits (this is just PRP2 and PRP1 with the inputs selected by
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choosing m bits then applying a permutation, P1 or P2, to the input before giving it to the
pseudorandom permutation).
Claim 1: Perm2 is a SPRP.
Proof. In order for Perm2 to be a SPRP it must not be possible to distinguish Perm2
from a random permutation on polynomially many (n) queries to PA and its inverse, PB.
For simplicity, when we say an adversary is querying Perm1 or Perm2, we mean the
adversary is able to issue queries to both the permutation and its inverse. The adversary
does not have direct access to P1 and P2, meaning the adversary is not able to query P1
and use the output as input to PRP2 and/or queryP2 and use the output as input to PRP1.
The adversary can only give inputs to PA and PB.
– Let (pi, ci), for i = 1 to n be pairs of m bit strings such that ci = PA(pi).
– Let < +, pi > denote a query to PA using input pi.
– Let < −, ci > denote a query to PB using input ci.
– Let ti be the output of the ith query. ti = ci when the query is < +, pi > and ti = pi
when the query is < −, ci >.
– Let T = (t1, t2, ....tn) be the output of n distinct queries to PA. If the ith query is
< +, pi > and the jth query is < −, ci >, tj = pi if and only if ti = cj , for i 6= j.
Without loss of generality we can assume that if an adversary queries with < +, pi >
that he will not later query with < −, ci > since he knows the answer will be pi
regardless of whether he is querying Perm1 or Perm2.
– Let U = (u1, u2, ....un) be the output of n distinct queries made to Perm1.
We will refer to U and T as transcripts of Perm1 and Perm2, respectively. In order
for Perm2 to be a SPRP, it must not be possible to distinguish T from U with non-
negligible probability. The probability of ui+1 ocurring given (p1, c1), (p2, c2)...(pi, ci)
is 1
2m−i







Since PA is a pseudorandom permutation, it is not possible to distinguish the output,
ti, of any single query from the output of a random permutation with non-negligible prob-
ability. For any single query to PA, the output occurs with probability 1
2m
+ e for some
negligible e. When given i queries to PA, the (i+ 1)st such query produces an output that
occurs with probability 1
2m−i
+ eAi for negligible eAi . Likewise, when given i queries to
PB, the (i + 1)st such query produces an output that occurs with probability 1
2m−i
+ eBi
for negligible eBi . Even though PA and PB are inverses of each other, there is no non-
negligible relationship between the outputs of PA and PB because these are the outputs






) + eA for negligible eA. A transcript of n2 distinct queries





) + eB for negligible eB .
We consider the probability with which a transcript, TPA, of n1 queries to PA oc-
curs and with which a transcript, TPB , of n2 queries to PB occurs. Suppose an adver-
sary makes n1 queries to PA and that between the queries, the adversary is given (pl, cl)
pairs that correspond to PA (ı.e., the adversary is given extra pairs for which he did not
need to expend resources) such that overall, the adversary is given n2 such pairs. The ad-
versary will not repeat any query or make a query for which he already been given the
outcome. Let nai be the number of (pl, cl) pairs the adversary has been given prior to
the (i + 1)st query to PA. nai ≥ nai−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. TPA occurs with probabil-





) + ePA for negligible ePA. Suppose an adversary makes
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n2 queries are made to PB and that between the queries, the adversary is given (pl, cl)
pairs that correspond to PB (ı.e., the adversary is given extra pairs for which he did not
need to expend resources) such that overall, the adversary is given n1 such pairs. The ad-
versary will not repeat any query or make a query for which he already been given the
outcome. Let nbj be the number of (pl, cl) pairs the adversary has been given prior to






) + ePB for negligible ePB .
When n = n1 + n2 queries are made to Perm2 such that n1 queries are made to PA
and n2 are made to PB (the queries can be in any order), the probability of the resulting
transcript, T , from Perm2 can be written as the product of PrA and PrB . Let qBi be the
number of queries made to PB between the ith and (i + 1)st queries to PA. Let qAj be
the number of queries made to PA between the jth and (j+1)st queries to PB. By setting
nai =
∑i
k=0 qAk and nbj =
∑j







































+ e for negligible e.
Therefore, it is not possible to distinguish T from U with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 5. A five-round elastic network on b + y bits in which each round function is an
independently chosen PRP on b bits is a variable-length SPRP on b + y bits for any fixed
value of y where 0 ≤ y ≤ b. Five rounds are the minimum number of rounds required.
Fig. 4. Five-Round Elastic Network as Two PRPs and Two Permutations
Proof. Refer to Section 5 for an example showing why four rounds are insufficient.
G′ refers to a five-round elastic network on b + y bits with round functions that are
independently chosen PRPs on b bits. G′ can be defined in a format consistant with the
four permutations used in Claim 1: P1, P2, PRP1, PRP2. Figure 4 shows a five-round
elastic network represented in this manner. In the figure, the RFi’s are independently chosen
pseudorandom permutations.
– Let P1 refer to the first round of G′, including the swap step.
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– Let P2 refer to the inverse of the last round ofG′, including the swap step that precedes
the round function. i.e., P2 is the first round in G′−1.
– P1 and P2 are independently chosen permutations, because each RFi is a indepen-
dently chosen pseudorandom permutations. The exact permutations used for P1 and
P2 are unknown because they involveRF1 andRF4, respectively. P1 and P2 are not
pseudorandom because they can be distinguished from a random permutation by using
queries where the b bit portion of input is held constant and the y-bit portion is varied.
– Let PRP2 refer to the last four rounds of G′; i.e., all steps in G′ after P1.
– Let PRP1 refer to the inverse of the first four rounds of G′, excluding the swap step
after the third round. PRP1 consists of all steps in G′−1 after P2.
PRP1 and PRP2 are PRPs on b + y bits by Theorems 4 and 3. PRP1 6= PRP2−1.
P1 and P2 are permutations on b + y bits. By setting PA = PRP2(P1(x)) and PB =
PRP1(P2(x)), PB = PA−1. Therefore, by Claim 1, G′ is a SPRP.
In our analysis for the three, four and five round cases, we required the round functions
be independently chosen random permutations. It may be possible to relax the requirement
that the round functions must independently chosen PRPs in a manner similar to what
was done by Naor and Reingold in their analysis of Feistel networks [8]. While we have
not determined to what extent the independence of the round functions can be relaxed, we
know that at least two of the round functions must differ, except with negligible probability.
Specifically, a three-round elastic network and the inverse of a four-round elastic network
in which the round functions are identical are not PRPs. The proofs are provided in Section
5. These results indicate some independence is required of the round functions.
5 Counter-Examples
We provide a lower bound on the minimum number of rounds needed in an elastic network
to create variable-length PRPs and variable-length SPRPs by providing examples of when
fewer rounds are not PRPs and SPRPs. We also show that a certain level of independence is
required between the round functions by considering cases when all of the round functions
are identical. First, we show that at least three rounds are needed for an elastic network to
be a PRP by proving that a two-round elastic network is not a PRP regardless of the round
functions. Second, we show that a three-round elastic network is not a PRP when the round
functions are identical. Third, we show that the inverse of a three-round elastic network is
not a PRP regardless of the round functions. Fourth, we show that the inverse of a four-
round elastic network is not a PRP when the round functions are identical. Fifth, we show
that three and four-round elastic networks are not SPRPs, regardless of the round functions.
When proving an elastic network is not a variable-length PRP or variable-length SPRP
under specific conditions on the number of rounds and/or round functions, it is sufficient to
provide an example for one block size. All of the counter-examples use a 2b-bit block size
(y = b). Each example will not hold with probability 1 when y < b.
Claim 2:
An elastic network with exactly two rounds is not a PRP.
Proof. This claim holds regardless of the properties of the round functions. Consider the
case where y = b. Given two 2b-bit plaintexts of the form B||Y 1 and B||Y 2 (the b-bit
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portion is the same in each), let the ciphertexts be denoted by C1||Z1 and C2||Z2, respec-
tively. Z1 = Z2 with probability 1. If the two-round construction was a PRP on b+ y bits,
then for large b, this equality would occur with probability 2−b ± e for negligible e instead
of with probability 1.
Fig. 5. Three-Round Elastic Network with Identical Round Functions
Claim 3:
A three-round elastic network is not a PRP when the round functions are identical.
Proof. Consider the case shown in Figure 5 when y = b. Let 0 denote a string of y ze-
roes. Encrypt B||0 and let C1||Z1 denote the resulting ciphertext. Z1 = f1(f1(B)).
C1 = f1(f1(f1(B))⊕f1(B)). Then encryptB||Z1 and letC2||Z2 denote the ciphertext.
Z2 = C1 with probability 1. If this three-round network was a PRP on b+ y bits, then for
large b, this equality would occur with probability 2−b ± e for negligible e instead of with
probability 1.
Claim 4:
The inverse of a three-round elastic network is not a PRP.
Proof. This is illustrated in Figure 6. The inputs to the round functions are defined in the
directions of the arrows in the figure and correspond to the direction of decryption. This
claim holds regardless of the properties of the round functions and is due to the fact that,
when y = b, the input to the inverse of the second round function is known because it is
the rightmost y bits. In contrast, in the encryption direction, the XOR after the first round
prevents the input to the second round function from being chosen. Let 0 denote a string
of b zeroes. When y = b, create four 2b-bit ciphertexts of the form C1||0, C2||0, C1||Z
and C2||Z where C1 6= C2 and Z 6= 0. Let the plaintexts be denoted by B1||Y 1, B2||Y 2,
B3||Y 3 and B4||Y 4. Then Y 1 = f2−1(0) ⊕ f3−1(C1), Y 2 = f2−1(0) ⊕ f3−1(C2),
Y 3 = f2−1(Z) ⊕ Z ⊕ f3−1(C1) and Y 4 = f2−1(Z) ⊕ Z ⊕ f3−1(C2). As a result,
Y 1 ⊕ Y 2 = Y 3 ⊕ Y 4 with probability 1. If the three-round network was a PRP on 2b
bits in the decryption direction, then for large b, this equality would occur with probability
2−b± e for negligible e instead of with probability 1. When y < b, the attack does not hold
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Fig. 6. Three-Round Elastic Network: Chosen Ciphertext Attack
with probability 1 because the input to the second round of decryption contains b − y bits
of f4−4(Ci). These b− y bits would have to be equal for f4−4(C1) and f4−4(C2).
Fig. 7. Four-Round Elastic Network with Identical Round Functions
Claim 5:
The inverse of a four-round elastic network in which the round functions are identical
is not a PRP.
Proof. Consider the case shown in Figure 7 when y = b. Let 0 denote a string of b ze-
roes. Decrypt 0||0 and let B1||Y 1 denote the resulting plaintext. B1 = f1−1(0). Y 1 =
f1−1(f1−1(0)) = f1−1(B1). Decrypt 0||B1 and let B2||Y 2 denote the resulting plain-
text. Y 2 = f1−1(B1) ⊕ f1−1(0) = Y 1 ⊕ B1 with probability 1. If the inverse of this
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four-round network was a PRP on b + y bits, then for large b, this equality would occur
with probability 2−b ± e for negligible e instead of with probability 1.
Neither a three-round nor a four-round elastic network is a SPRP. In both cases, this
can be shown with an adaptive chosen plaintext - chosen ciphertext attack in which two
chosen plaintexts are encrypted then two chosen plaintexts formed from the two resulting
ciphertexts are decrypted. We include one four-round counter-example here.
Fig. 8. Four-Round Elastic Network: Chosen Plaintext - Chosen Ciphertext Attack
Claim 6:
A four-round elastic network is not a SPRP when b = y.
Proof. This claim holds regardless of the properties of the round functions and is due to
the fact that a three-round elastic network in the decryption direction is not a PRP. In the
three round case, using chosen ciphertexts only, a relationship can be pushed through the
three rounds of decryption into the right half of the output with probability 1 when y = b.
In the four round case, the same approach is used in that the halves of two ciphertexts
are switched to form to new ciphertexts and push a relationship into the rightmost y bits
of the output of the third round. When y = b, this becomes the entire input to the round
function in the fourth round of decryption. This time, one plaintext must be encrypted to
assist in providing the values from which the ciphertexts are formed. The sequence of three
decryptions and one encryption shown in Figure 8 can be used to distinguish the four-round
elastic network from a SPRP when y = b. Each plaintext and ciphertext is of length 2b,
ı.e. |B| = |Bi| = |Y i| = |Ci| = |Zi| = b ∀i. Let 0 denote a string of y zeroes. Decrypt
a ciphertext of the form C1||0. Let B1||Y 1 be the resulting plaintext. Encrypt a plaintext
of the form B1||Y 2 with Y 2 6= Y 1. Let C2||Z2 be the resulting ciphertext. The output of
the first round function, α1, is identical in both the decryption and encryption. Form two
ciphertexts, C2||0 and C1||Z2, and decrypt them. Let B3||Y 3 and B4||Y 4 denote the two
resulting plaintexts. B3 = B4 with probability 1.
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Notice that: α1 = f4−1(C1)⊕ f3−1(0) = Z2⊕ f4−1(C2)⊕ f3−1(Z2)
α3 = f4−1(C2)⊕ f3−1(0)
α4 = Z2⊕ f4−1(C1)⊕ f3−1(Z2)
By rearranging the equations for α1:
f4−1(C2)⊕ f3−1(0) = Z2⊕ f4−1(C1)⊕ f3−1(Z2).
Therefore, α3 = α4 and B3 = B4.
6 Discussion and Extensions
Our analysis validates the soundness of the underlying structure used in creating elastic
block ciphers. We have proven that a three-round elastic network and the inverse of a
four-round elastic network are variable-length PRPs and a five-round elastic network is
a variable-length SPRP when the round functions are independently chosen PRPs. These
results allow for the creation of (b + y)-bit PRPs and SPRPs from b-bit PRPs, for each
value of y where 0 ≤ y ≤ b. We also proved that these are the minimum number of rounds
required and that the results do not hold when all of the round functions are identical.
We can extend our PRP and SPRP constructions to cover a wider range of input sizes
by using instances of CMC mode [5] as the round functions within the elastic network.
CMC mode produces mb-bit SPRPs from a fixed-length b-bit PRP, where m is an integer
and 2 ≤ m ≤ α, for some integer upper bound of α. It involves encrypting data using a
block cipher in CBC mode, applying a mask, then encrypting the resulting data in a reverse
CBC mode. By using a b-bit PRP in CMC mode for each of the round functions in the
elastic network (the PRPs are still independently chosen across each round), we are able to
create variable-length SPRPs on a larger range of input lengths, in single bit increments,
then when using the elastic network by itself.
Theorem 6. A variable-length SPRP accepting inputs of lengthmb+y, where 2 ≤ m ≤ α
and y is a fixed value such that 0 ≤ y ≤ mb, can be formed from using instances of CMC
mode as the round functions in a five-round elastic network. Independently chosen fixed-
length PRPs on b bits are used across the instances of CMC mode. αb is the minimal upper
bound on the length of SPRPs produced by the five instances of CMC mode.
Proof. (sketch) The result follows directly from the fact that the individual instances of
CMC mode are SPRPs [5] and Theorem 5. The round functions in the elastic network are
the SPRPs created from instances of CMC mode. The block size supported by the round
functions will be the shortest of the lengths supported by the instances of CMC mode. Let
αb be the minimum upper bound on the length of SPRPs produced by the five instances
of CMC mode. The length of the round functions within the elastic network must be of
the same length; therefore, the maximum length supported by the round functions is αb.
The elastic network extends the supported input length to 2αb. By varying the block size
supported by the round function from 2b to αb, SPRPs on all input lengths between 2b and
2αb can be formed. We also note that a PRP on mb+ y bits is formed by using CMC mode
in a three or four elastic network instead of a five round elastic network.
This combination for supporting variable-length inputs is unique from previous designs
of variable-length block ciphers that worked on any input length [1, 9]. Those constructions
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work by creating an IV to use with the cipher in counter mode, then create a key stream
to XOR with all but one block of the data. When dealing with input lengths beyond two
blocks, the use of CMC mode and the elastic network provides an alternative approach
to [1, 9] that does not apply a key stream, but rather creates a permutation that results in
diffusion across all of the bits.
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